Grounds for Interrupting the Limitation Period – Why They Cannot Be Extended by Contractual Agreement
The institution of limitation is one of the fundamental principles of civil law, as it defines the temporal framework within which claims may be enforced. Upon the expiry of the limitation period, the possibility of enforcing a claim through judicial proceedings ceases, even though the underlying substantive right may continue to exist.
For this reason, it is of particular importance which legal facts (acts or events) are capable of interrupting the limitation period. If the limitation period is interrupted, the limitation period starts to run anew [Section 6:25 (2) of the Hungarian Civil Code], which in practice means that the claimant may enforce its claim against the obligor before the courts for a longer period of time.
1. Change in Regulation: Removal of the Payment Demand from the grounds for interruption the limitation
With the entry into force of Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code (the “Civil Code”) on 15 March 2014, a significant change occurred in relation to the grounds interrupting the limitation period compared to the former regulation under Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code (the “former Civil Code”).
One of the most substantial changes was that a payment demand, which under the former Civil Code qualified as a ground interrupting the limitation period, was removed from the list of legal facts interrupting limitation. As a consequence, a written payment demand in itself no longer has a statutory interrupting effect on the limitation period.
2. Contractual practice: parties extended the grounds for interruption
In contractual practice, however, it became relatively widespread for parties to agree in their contracts that a payment demand interrupts the limitation period.
This practice was based on the interpretation that the limitation rules of the Civil Code are of a dispositive nature, meaning that the parties may deviate from them by mutual agreement. This interpretation relied on Section 6:1 (3) of the Civil Code, pursuant to which the parties may, by mutual consent, deviate from the common rules governing the rights and obligations of the parties to an obligation, unless such deviation is prohibited by law.
Given that the Civil Code does not contain an explicit prohibition on modifying the scope of grounds interrupting limitation, many concluded that the range of legal facts interrupting the limitation period could be extended by contractual agreement.
3. The position of the Curia: the scope of interruption cannot be extended
However, in its decision Pfv.21050/2024/7, the Curia (Supreme Court) clearly took a position on this issue. According to the decision: “The contractual freedom of the parties does not extend to determining alternative grounds for interrupting the limitation period; accordingly, the statutory grounds for interruption of limitation under the Civil Code may not be extended by agreement.” [BH 2025.9.211]
Consequently, the rules governing the interruption of the limitation period do not fall within the scope of the parties’ contractual autonomy. The parties’ agreement therefore cannot override the statutory system governing interruption of limitation, and the range of grounds interrupting the limitation period cannot be expanded by agreement.
The Curia’s most recent case law has thus clarified that the grounds for interrupting the limitation period are not dependent on contractual agreement, but constitute a statutory legal institution defined by law and inherently linked to the enforceability of a substantive right. Accordingly, the parties’ agreement is not capable of extending the grounds for interruption of limitation as set out in the Civil Code.
In light of the above judicial practice, it is therefore justified to review already concluded contracts from this perspective. Furthermore, where the enforcement of a claim arises, early involvement of legal counsel is strongly recommended.